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Abstract 
The Brazilian electricity market has certain particularities that contribute to considerably distinguish it 
from other markets. With a continental interconnected transmission system in which around 70% of 
the total installed capacity comes from hydropower plants, this electricity market recently passed 
through two large institutional reforms and it currently contains a number of special features together 
with other usual market instruments. Nevertheless, the conciliation between the commercial 
commitments of the market participants and the physical dispatch is not smooth. Moreover, the 
Brazilian short-term market is a mechanism to settle differences rather than a market, and the 
electricity short-term market price and the schedule dispatch are not determined through the 
interaction between market participants. This paper focuses on these problems, discusses some 
dilemmas that have to be faced if a more conventional market oriented approach is to be adopted, and 
proposes a solution in order to address these issues. Pointing towards the enhancing of the flexibility 
for market participants to bear their contracts, while still ensuring the efficient use of the energy 
resources and maintaining the current level of the security of supply, this new framework was 
designed based on a virtual reservoir model. 
Keywords 
Brazilian electricity market, market design, virtual reservoir model 
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1. Introduction 
The electricity industry has changed over the years from vertically integrated utilities to more 
decentralized structures and competitive electricity markets. Ever since, several electricity market 
structures are being designed and tested to ensure free access, fair competition, higher efficiency, 
while maintain or improving reliability and security of operation. 
The Brazilian electricity market has certain particularities that contribute to considerably 
distinguish it from other markets. With a continental interconnected transmission system, a large and 
growing demand, a total generation installed capacity around 135 GW, from which around 70% comes 
from hydropower plants, this electricity market passed through two large institutional and regulatory 
reforms in the last 20 years and it currently contains special instruments such as the Mechanism for 
Reallocation of Energy and the Seasonalization process. 
The first reform promoted a transition from the vertical integrated utility structure to a market 
where agents could freely negotiate contracts. Besides that, the quantities that were traded by contracts 
have been reduced whereas more trading in the short-term market was encouraged (Arango et. al., 
2006). During this time, Brazil had a decentralized energy planning, but with an indicative energy 
planning conducted by the National Council for Energy Policy (CNPE). Then, in 2001 Brazil 
experienced a major supply crisis, which led to an aggressive energy rationing from June 2001 to 
February 2002. The 2001/2002 energy rationing had major economic and political impacts and 
encompassed about 80% of population, GDP and electricity consumption (Maurer et. al., 2005). 
Driven by the mentioned rationing, the second reform took place as an electoral commitment of the 
opposition party, who won the Presidential election in 2002. This reform basically pushed Brazil to a 
structure corresponding to the single buyer model, but preserving some competition features in the 
retail market. In practice, a new regulatory framework (introduced by Law 10848/2004) was 
implemented in 2004 bringing back some old fundaments and adding new guidelines: 
A. Reintroduction of the long-term centralized planning conducted by the federal government to address the 
security of supply. Thus, the expansion of the system doesn’t rely on a market-based economy; 
B. Competition through public auctions according to the single buyer model. The main target of this scheme 
is to provide affordable tariffs to the growing economy; 
C. Implementation of long-term contracts (PPAs) with availability of payment. The goal was to foster the 
installation of thermal power plants; 
D. Requirement that consumers must be fully supplied by energy and power purchase contracts, and all 
contracts must be registered in the Brazilian market operator (CCEE); 
E. Requirement that sellers must have enough capacity when selling energy and power to entirely ensure 
their contracts; and 
F. Restructuring of the commercialization processes by creation of two contracting environments: the ACR - 
Regulated Contracting Environment and the ACL - Free Contracting Environment. 
Both the implementation of PPAs with availability of payment (item C) and a mandatory bilateral 
contracting scheme (item D) with physical backing (item E) were adopted to guarantee the return of 
investments and address the security of supply, since this was appointed as one of the reasons of the 
above mentioned rationing. 
Regarding item D, it is relevant to reinforce that the electricity demand of both distribution utilities 
(on behalf of captive consumers) and free consumers must ensure the compliance of 100% of their 
consumptions by energy and power purchase bilateral contracts (Decree 5163/2004, art 2º, items II 
and III). Otherwise, specified penalties will be applied to them. As a result, this legal provision 
definitely imposes a bottleneck on the trading of electricity into the short-term market. 
Felipe A. Calabria, J. Tomé Saraiva and Jean-Michel Glachant 
2 
Concerning item E, it means that all electricity sold by sellers should be 100% physically backed 
(Decree 5163/2004, art 2º, item I). This “physical coverage for sale” consists of what is known as 
“physical guarantee” of the power plants. The physical guarantee corresponds to the maximum 
amounts of energy associated with each power plant project. Relating to hydros, physical guarantee 
corresponds to the maximum energy production that can be maintained almost continuously over the 
years, simulating the occurrence of thousands of inflow sequences created statistically, and assuming a 
certain risk of not feeding the load (ANEEL, 2013). To sum up, the physical guarantee, which is 
defined by the Ministry of Mines and Energy (MME), has the value of a certificate that determines the 
amount of energy that each power plant can trade. 
2. From Market Results to Physical Operation of the Power System  
For end consumers, the Brazilian electricity market operates in two ways. It operates under 
competition in the retail market, named ACL, for those eligible consumers that fit in the characteristic 
of free consumers or special consumers, and it works according to the single buyer model structure, 
entitled ACR, for the final consumers that are not free to choose their supplier. 
In the ACR, prices are determined by national public auctions. Differently, in the ACL prices are 
freely negotiated between buyers and sellers through a non-organized market like OTC, where a lot of 
traders can mediate the deal between consumers and producers, or through emerging private power 
exchanges. Additionally, there is also the short-term market, in Brazil known as MCP, which is 
designed to account for and settle the differences between the contracted energy amounts and the 
generated/consumed energy. 
There are several kinds of national public auctions. Some of them are implemented to buy “new 
energy”, i.e. electricity that will be produced by power plants that still have to be built, while others 
aim at buying electricity from power plants already under operation. Moreover, there are also specific 
auctions designed to buy electricity only from renewable energy sources (such as wind, PV, biomass 
and small hydros), to raise the level of security of supply (reserve energy auction), and to promote the 
feasibility of relevant and structuring projects. Figure 1 shows average prices of ACR auctions carried 
out between 2004 and 2012 by energy source. 
Figure 1 – Average prices by types of auctions in Brazil (Rosa et. al., 2013) 
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Then, all contracts must be registered at the market operator (CCEE) in order to be considered in the 
settlement process of the MCP. Additionally, when a power plant becomes available for operation, the 
CCEE considers the associated physical guarantee available to be also settled. Then, regularly in 
December of every year, market participants can perform a seasonal adjustment of the contracted 
energy and of the physical guarantee to be applied for the entire next year (CCEE, 2012). This process 
is called “seasonalization” and, in other words, it allows distributing the total annual amount in 
monthly MWh packages. Besides the seasonalization, the MWh are also allocated in three load steps, 
in a process known as “modulation”. 
The power plants are then dispatched by the system operator (ONS) in order to optimize the 
hydrothermal system and to efficiently use energy resources. The dispatch is performed without 
considering the amount of the contracted energy and physical guarantee. Instead of a market-based 
approach, the dispatch is defined based on the solution of a minimum operational cost problem that 
seeks for a trade-off between saving water now and using thermal fuel (if the expectation of inflows is 
low) or using water now and saving thermal fuel (if the expectation of inflows is favourable). 
Furthermore, concerning the coordination of the operation, since there are a lot of cascades of hydro 
stations with different owners, it is also important to consider the use of the potential energy stored in 
the reservoirs installed in the same water basin. 
As a consequence, the dispatch is centralized and the optimal dispatch problem is currently solved 
basically through a stochastic dynamic programming software package called NEWAVE together with 
a linear programming software called DECOMP. The two main outputs of these two packages are as 
follows: the dispatch schedule of the power plants under operation and connected to the National 
Interconnected System; and the Brazilian short-term market prices, well-known as PLD (Price of the 
Differences Settlement). Both of them are weekly established for each load step of the day. 
Because the dispatch is performed by the ISO in a centralized way and it decides the market 
participants’ outputs without considering their contracted energy, and once generators need to bear 
their contracts by delivering the electricity committed through contracts, there is in Brazil a 
mechanism called Mechanism for Reallocation of Energy (MRE). The MRE is applied to hydros, that 
usually close contracts following the modality for quantity, i.e., they are committed to deliver a certain 
amount of electricity (MWh) during a specific period at a pre-defined price. The goal of this 
mechanism is to cover the risk of generators having to buy electricity in the short-term market at PLD 
to fill in the amount of energy committed in their contracts. 
All generators receive their contractual payment because they sell the “physical guarantee assigned 
to them”, and not because they sell the “actual electricity produced by them”. Then, in each 
accounting period, the MRE reallocates energy, transferring the surplus generated from those that 
produce beyond their physical guarantee to those that produce below. So, if the own production of a 
hydro station is less than its physical guarantee (which is calculated in long term to represent the 
amount of electricity that can be continuously produced), this station will receive energy from stations 
that produced more. 
The own production plus the energy allocated from the MRE is equal to the verified energy, which 
is then compared with the contracted energy, and the resulting difference is settled in the short-term 
market (MCP) at the short-term market price (PLD). This settlement is performed for each agent and it 
is illustrated in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2 – Traded energy in MCP: negative exposition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To bring this section to a close, Table 1 shows a number of types of contracts from both the ACR 
and the ACL, and briefly explains how the dispatch procedure is carry out by the system operator 
(ONS) and the settlement of exposed positions performed by the market operator (CCEE). 
Table 1 – The ACR and ACL markets, the dispatch procedure and the MCP 
ACR - Regulated 
Contracting 
Environment 
ACL - Free 
Contracting 
Environment 
ISO dispatch 
procedure 
Brazilian short-term 
market (MCP) 
Types of contracts involved: 
How generators are 
dispatched by ONS? 
How exposed positions 
are settled by CCEE? 
 CCEAR (Contract for 
Electricity Trading in the 
Regulated Environment) 
 CCEAL (Contract for 
Electricity Trading in 
the Free Environment) 
 ISO knows the installed 
capacity, availability, 
and fuel cost of 
generators. 
 ISO also knows the 
predicted consumption 
due distribution 
companies’ monthly 
declarations. 
 ISO forecasts the 
weather to stipulate 
rivers inflows. 
 It is run software based 
on stochastic dynamic 
and linear programming 
to establish the dispatch 
schedule and the PLD. 
 All closed contracts (in 
both ACR and ACL) have 
to be recorded in CCEE. 
 CCEE performs 
measurements of the 
amounts actually 
produced / consumed by 
each agent. 
 MRE is applied for 
participants of this 
mechanism. 
 Differences between 
contracted energy and the 
verified energy are 
accounted. 
 Exposed positions are 
valued by PLD. 
 CER (Contract for Reserve Energy), signed between 
CCEE and sellers agents 
 CONUER (Contract for Use Reserve Energy), signed 
between CCEE and consumption agents 
 Contracts for Distributed 
Generation 
 CCEI (Contract for 
Purchase Encouraged 
Electricity) 
 Contracts of Adjustments 
 Contracts of PROINFA 
(Program of Incentives 
for Alternative Electricity 
Sources) 
 Contracts of Itaipu 
Hydropower Plant 
 
From 
MRE 
 
Own 
production 
 
Physical guarantee 
(Seasonalized and 
modulated) 
Contracted energy 
(Seasonalized and 
modulated) 
MCP 
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3. Problems 
Notwithstanding, there are some problems that arise from this market design, which are discussed 
below. 
3.1 Problem 1: The conciliation between the commercial commitments of the market participants 
and the physical dispatch is not smooth 
In order to trade both energy and power, several markets have emerged with the market liberalization: 
day-ahead, intraday, balancing, forward, future and options markets. However, when all these markets 
are operating together it should have a concern related with the coordination conditions between them. 
For instance, it is possible that weak links exist between forward and short-term markets, as well as 
between the distinct markets for electricity and reserves. 
(Wilson, 1999) addresses this concern bringing the idea of the “sequence of markets”, which means 
that a rich sequence of forward markets (e.g. long-forward, day-ahead, hour-ahead, spot) approximates 
a single complete market. Thus, the “incompleteness of the market” can be addressed by repeated 
trading of a few simple contracts in order to allow contingent contracts to come close to a complete 
market. As a result, frequent trading opportunities enhance the completeness of the entire market. 
In the Brazilian case, there is no balancing market, neither an intraday, day-ahead, options nor 
future markets. Instead of that, there is an annual “window” to monthly distribute the physical 
guarantee and the contracted energy (via the seasonalization process already described) and, once the 
centralized dispatch is carried out by the ISO (not considering the signed contracts), generators are not 
allowed to, in the medium and the short-term, decide their own generation in order to bear their 
contracts. As shown in Figure 3, this can significantly expose them to the risk of having to buy 
electricity in the MCP at the high volatile PLD in order to deliver the energy committed in their 
contracts. 
Figure 3 – Traded energy in MCP: negative exposition 
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their positions engaged by bilateral contracts. This fact can be viewed as a higher completeness of the 
market when compared with a market where participants close their positions by long-term contracts. 
Table 2 –Conciliation between physical dispatch and commercial commitments 
Electricity 
industry 
structures 
Contracts between 
market participants 
System operator dispatch 
Conciliation between 
dispatch schedule and 
contracted positions  
Costs/prices passed on to 
tariff of final consumers 
Vertically 
integrated 
utility 
Without contracts 
(command and control 
management) 
System operator dispatches 
considering the minimal 
operational cost, since it a priori 
knows each marginal cost. 
There aren’t electricity 
market and contracts 
involved, so there isn’t 
need for conciliation. 
Consumers pay for the 
cost of each MWh 
produced based on cost 
of service regulation. 
Single buyer 
model 
 
 (Brazilian 
case) 
 Long-term contracts 
(PPA) via public 
auctions in the ACR 
 
 Ancillary services are 
provided by grid 
codes and by 
contracting for 
reactive energy 
 
 Medium-term 
contracts in the ACL 
 Minimization of the operation 
cost through the tight pool 
approach. 
 
ISO doesn’t consider the amount 
of electricity sold or bought 
through contracts (it just uses the 
price from the public auction to 
perform the merit order). 
Generators are not active in this 
central-dispatch procedure. 
It is expected that 
participants bear their 
closed contracts by their 
own production. However, 
it is the ISO who decides 
their outputs without 
considering their contracted 
amounts. So, it is needed a 
mechanism (the MRE) to 
share the associated risk. 
 Prices of the PPAs, 
which have two 
components: energy 
payment and 
availability payment; 
 
 
PS: Participants settle 
imbalances. 
Wholesale 
and retail 
competition 
 
 (like Texas in 
2000) 
 Bilateral physical 
contracts 
 
 Balancing market 
 
 Financial forward 
contracts 
 Minimization of the difference 
between the closed contract and 
the real production. 
 
In short-term, generators submit 
notifications to the ISO/TSO, 
which are expected to be equal to 
contracted positions. ISO/TSO 
dispatches considering these 
notifications. Generators are 
active through a self-dispatch 
procedure. 
ISO/TSO tries to dispatch 
the exact amount of the 
physical notifications, i.e. 
his goal is to minimize the 
suppliers’ exposed 
position. 
 Prices coming from the 
bilateral contracts and 
balancing market; 
 
PS: Participants settle 
financial contracts and 
imbalances. 
Wholesale 
and retail 
competition 
 
 (like some 
USA states, 
and European 
countries) 
 Short-term markets, 
as day-ahead and 
intraday 
 
 Balancing market 
 
 Financial and 
physical forward 
contracts 
 Minimization of the operation 
cost through the loose pool 
approach. 
 
Sellers and buyers submit their 
bids. Power Exchange dispatches 
considering the successful bids. 
Generators influence, through 
their bids, the dispatch schedule. 
ISO/TSO implements 
technical adjustments to 
enforce violated 
constraints. 
 Price of the short-term 
markets and balancing 
market; 
 
PS: Participants settle 
financial contracts and 
imbalances. 
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3.2 Problem 2: The Brazilian short-term market is a mechanism to settle differences rather than a 
market 
The MCP takes place after the dispatch of the ISO. Unlike other market designs addressed in Table 2, 
the Brazilian short-term market is not the marketplace where generators are active through a self-
dispatch procedure, or generators influence, through their bids, the dispatch. Ultimately, the Brazilian 
short-term market is not an environment where market participants meet in order to perform short-
term trades on behalf of their own account. 
Neither party arrives at some point to make any declaration of intent in the short-term. Moreover, 
the price that values these transactions (PLD) does not result from the interaction of market 
participants, but comes from the application of a chain of software packages, which is run by a third 
party entity. In summary, it would be a short-term market if, in this environment, market participants 
meet with each other in order to negotiate electricity and close agreements in the short-term according 
to their own will. 
So, contrasting with other short-term markets, the MCP is a mechanism to settle differences 
between the amounts of electricity committed by contracts and those amounts of electricity that each 
agent ends up providing / receiving. These differences, illustrated in the Figure 2, must be 
automatically purchased or sold in the MCP. 
Figure 4 synthesizes relevant points related with this issue. Once all consumption has to be 
contracted ex-ante and contracts have to be physically backed, structurally the Brazilian market was 
designed to have no mismatches between the “computed long-term production (physical guarantee) 
and the foreseen consumption”. As a consequence, it is the responsibility of the MCP to deal with the 
differences that may occur due to the mismatch between the monthly verified energy and the 
contracted energy. 
Figure 4 – An overview of the commercialization processes  
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80% of the electricity produced in Brazil comes from hydropower plants, this is performed by two 
computational programs (NEWAVE and DECOMP) that value the present electricity cost considering, 
among other variables, future scenarios of water inflows. 
Therefore, inconsistencies in these algorithms have a huge impact within the entire sector, and the 
confidence of the market can be affected. Unfortunately, during 2007 and 2011, relevant problems 
related with inconsistencies in these models were detected. These problems caused a large impact on 
the electricity sector, not to mention transparency problems since the software codes have intellectual 
property rights and, therefore, they are unknown by the market participants and the authorities, 
inducing some instability in the Brazilian electricity sector. 
4. Dilemmas 
A solution typically adopted in other markets is the employment of a more market oriented approach. 
This market approach could enable all generators to offer, in short-term, quantity and price bids, which 
would be used to set the market positions and, consequently, substitute the seasonalization process and 
the MRE. As a result, the short-term market price would be based on the interaction between market 
participants. Nevertheless, particularly focusing on a power system with large share of hydros, there 
are some dilemmas that must to be faced. 
4.1 Efficiency of energy resources 
The Brazilian and the New Zealand power systems are quite similar in terms of the importance of 
hydro generation. Both recently had around 60% of the electricity produced coming from hydropower 
plants (New Zealand System Operator, 2014) (ONS 2014a). However, in New Zealand generators 
make offers and are dispatched each half hour in a compulsory market pool. Thus, the offer stacks 
they submit are the only mechanism that they have to sculpt a varying generation plan to comply with 
their own constraints over the day. 
Additionally, in New Zealand the vast majority of the hydros in the same river are operated by a 
single generation company, and there is a block dispatch scheme that allows generators to rearrange 
the dispatch amongst their stations on the river-chain, as long the total energy delivered is the same as 
the required stations are geographically close. Nonetheless, an empirical study performed by Philpott 
et. al., 2010 quantified some production efficiency losses of this market. 
These authors developed a centrally-planned model in order to compare New Zealand market 
outcomes with a counterfactual central plan. The results show that the yearly centrally-planned policy 
incurs less fuel cost than the market approach. For 2005, 2006 and 2007, the saved fuel costs are, 
respectively, 16.0%, 13.4%, and 14.6% of the total generation cost. In conclusion, the main source of 
the inefficiency pointed out by these authors relies on the fact that the New Zealand decentralized 
dispatch is essentially an instantaneous process and the inter-temporal features of river chain 
operations are not represented in the single-period market clearing mechanism. 
Putting into perspective the dichotomy between a centralized dispatch (based on hierarchy) and a 
decentralized one (based on a market solution), it becomes clear the importance of the coordination of 
the use of the water stored in the reservoirs in order to safeguard the efficiency of using the energy 
resources. Moreover, the presence of several owners in the hydro cascades, which is the case of Brazil, 
endorses a market design based on a centralized dispatch. 
4.2 Security of supply 
Concerning the ability of the market to ensure sufficient capacity to meet the demand in the future, it 
must be kept in mind that generation companies will only invest in new power plants if they expect 
that their total costs (both variable and fixed costs) will be totally recovered in the end. Then, 
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considering the hypotheses that Brazilian electricity market will be operated entirely based on a short-
term market, the following question arises: Will the response of generators regarding the short-term 
market prices come in the form of new installed capacity? 
The Brazilian short-term market price, PLD is calculated for four submarkets (South, 
Southeast/Midwest, Northeast and North) and is set on a weekly basis for three load steps (heavy, 
medium and light). Regarding this issue, Figure 5 presents: the PLD curve
1
 (CCEE, 2014a); the hydro 
average successful price bid that came from public auctions (110.29 R$/MWh) (CCEE, 2014b); the 
hydro Average Variable Cost - AVC (12.73 R$/MWh)
2
; and the AVC starting point to dispatch the 
gas thermal power plants (125 R$/MWh)
3
 (ONS, 2014b). It is worth mentioning that the price bid in 
public auctions is the PPA contract price. Thus, the value 110.29 R$/MWh can be perceived as the 
hydro Average Total Cost (ATC), once at this level it is expected to recover both the Variable Cost 
(VC) and the Fixed Cost (FC). 
The Brazilian short-term market has about 15 years of existence. For the time being, the PLD has 
an average value of 109 R$/MWh. Therefore, it is close to the aforementioned 110.29. Nevertheless, it 
should be noted that, since the beginning of the PLD historical data, Brazil has passed through two 
large energy crises (in 2001-2002 and in 2013-2014) that made the PLD to remain in extreme levels 
for long periods. Besides, these so high price levels were not expected in a country that traditionally 
has an electricity matrix based on one of the lowest electricity production AVC technologies, hydro 
power. 
Figure 5 – PLD historic data: from 2001 to 2014  
 
Anyway, supposing that from now on there will be more thermal stations in the dispatch and, thus, the 
PLD will be frequently higher, the question is if the shape of the PLD curve will not be a barrier for 
the investment that intend to recover their FC and VC through the short-term market. At that point, the 
analysis rests on the PLD volatility. The PLD standard deviation of the entire set of data is around 160 
R$/MWh. With an average of 109 R$/MWh, a standard deviation equal to 160 imposes a big risk to 
the health of the business, especially regarding the stability of the cash flow. 
                                                     
1
 PLD shown in this figure is merged considering the four submarkets and the three load steps. 
2
 12.73 R$/MWh was achieve by computing regarding hydros in Brazil with installed capacity higher than 100 MW 
(ANEEL, 2012). 
3
 125 R$/MWh is equivalent to the percentile 20, i.e., 80% of the gas thermal power plants have a AVC higher than 125 
R$/MWh. 
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Finally, it is recognized the need to have a capacity mechanism in order to provide enough 
incentives to ensure the security of supply. Nowadays, this concern is addressed both via the 
contracting scheme where loads must to be fully ex-ante contracted and contracts physically backed, 
and via the dispatch of the ISO (either through the mechanism of risk aversion implement into the 
NEWAVE and DECOMP or through a dispatch out of the merit order authorized by a the CMSE - 
Electricity Sector Monitoring Committee
4
). 
4.3 Flexibility to bear contracts 
Notwithstanding the general opinions favor maintaining the current centralized dispatch in order to 
ensure the efficiency in the use of the energy resources and the security of supply, it is missing in the 
electricity market design some flexibility for hydros to better address their risk of exposition in the 
short-term market according to their own risk perception and strategy. 
There is one unique “window” (in December) to define the (monthly) amount of the physical 
guarantee that will bear the contracts. Taking into account the market completeness analysis, there is a 
lack of “trading opportunities”. Moreover, generators operate their power plants just following the 
amount of production defined by the ISO, and the MRE is automatically performed, which imposes a 
kind of strait jacket to the market participants. Taking a closer look at the seasonalization process and 
at MRE, the following situation brings to light a weakness of this market design.  
Every time that PLD is high, there are more dispatched thermal stations and less hydro dispatched 
units. Thermal power plants are typically contracted in the “modality for availability”, so they receive 
an availability payment and an additional remuneration for each MWh produced. Nevertheless, hydros 
are normally contracted in the “modality for quantity”, i.e. they are committed to deliver a certain 
amount of electricity (MWh) at a pre-defined price, and the difference between the contracted energy 
and the verified energy must be automatically bought or sold in the MCP at the PLD. 
Depending on the amount of thermal dispatch, hydros can be displaced in such a way that the total 
production in the MRE will not be larger or equal than the total physical guarantee of the MRE’s 
hydros. As a result, MRE will not have the extra energy to be shared among its participants. Unlike, an 
adjustment factor will be applied to withdraw a fraction from the seasonalized physical guarantee. 
Extending this reasoning to occasions of water scarcity, a large decrease in the seasonalized physical 
guarantee of all hydros participants of the MRE (current there are 528 hydros in the MRE) represents a 
widespread negative exposed position for these hydros.  
In order to illustrate this situation, Table 3 presents the allocation procedure considering four power 
stations having a total of generation of 80,000 MWh. The total verified energy to be allocated to each 
hydro is given by the multiplying of their own production by the adjustment factor (eq. 1). The 
adjustment factor is computed as the ratio between the total production and total seasonalized physical 
guarantee into the MRE (eq. 2). 
                (                 )   (              )    (1) 
                   (                   )   (                           )  (2) 
  
                                                     
4
 The CMSE is an authority established to mainly assess the conditions of supply adequacy of the country. 
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Table 3 – Into MRE: when things go really bad 
Hydro 
Own 
production 
(MWh x 
1,000) 
Physical 
guarantee 
(MWh x 
1,000) 
Adjustment  
factor 
Verified 
energy 
(MWh x 
1,000) 
TEO 
(R$/MWh) 
PLD 
(R$/MWh) 
Contracte
d energy 
(MWh x 
1,000) 
Financial 
Settlement 
(R$) 
Hydro A 37 50 
0.571 
28.57 
10.54 700.00 
50 -14,911,163 
Hydro B 12 40 22.86 40 -12,114,434 
Hydro C 7 20 11.43 20 -6,046,677 
Hydro D 24 30 17.14 30 -8,927,726 
Total = 80 140 - 80.00 - - 140 -42,000,000 
 
Since the total production (80,000 MWh) is less than the total allocated physical guarantee (140,000 
MWh), the adjustment factor (0.571) will be lower than one, and the verified energy will not fill the 
level of the physical guarantee. Considering the TEO (Energy Optimization Tariff)
5
 established for 
2014 (10.54 R$/MWh) (Approving Resolution ANEEL 1658/2013) and a PLD consistent with a 
situation of energy shortage (700 R$/MWh), the total financial settlement associated to the operation 
for these hydro stations is equal to a loss of R$ 42 million (or about U$ 18 million).Accordingly, all 
hydros stations must make substantial payments. Admitting that this situation will last for some 
months and that a plenty of hydro stations have to buy energy in the MCP at a very high PLD, this can 
seriously affect their cash flow. 
In short, in situations like the one illustrated above, the MRE is not able to cover the risk of 
generators that have to buy electricity in the short-term market to complete the energy committed in 
their contracts. This risk is called “hydrological risk” once hydros are being dispatched at lower levels 
because there is no enough water in their reservoirs. Unluckily, nowadays Brazil is facing a situation 
like this. Due to an unusual rainfall cycle that has lasted since 2012, the power system has a 
widespread water shortage, a large thermal dispatch and sky-rocketing short-term market prices. For 
this reason, hydros appealed to the Federal Government for financial support as reported in a Brazilian 
newspaper: 
“Hydro generators prepared a request for help to the Federal Government in order to equalize the 
negative financial impact on the revenues of hydro power plants participating in the Mechanism 
for Reallocation of Energy (MRE). Consultants estimate that the exposure of the generators to the 
short-term market can cause a loss of over R$ 20 billion in 2014.” (Jornal da Energia, 2014b) 
The Federal Government has been arguing that this is a business risk of hydros, and that it does not 
intend to relieve them. Hydros argue that the growing PLD curve was not taken into account by 
generators at the moment that they signed the long-term contracts. At the long term, this arm wrestling 
suggests that there will be a point in which the economic and financial balance of the projects can be 
severely affected. Pragmatically speaking, within this conjuncture the question to be answered is as 
follows: for how long this negative exposition can be supported by hydro companies? 
If each hydro would decide its own production, the management of their reservoir would be on 
their own. However, in the Brazilian case, the decisions regarding each production level, and 
consequently the amount of energy to be stored in the reservoirs, is made by a third party, the ISO. 
Nonetheless, hydrological risk is assumed by hydros, once the MRE doesn´t covers this risk. As 
pointed out by (IEA, 2005), the framework of incentives should be structured such that risks are 
allocated to those who make decisions and who hold responsibility for taking them into account. 
Lastly, this unsuitability emphasizes that it is missing in the market design some flexibility so that 
hydro companies can manage this risk in a more adequate way. 
                                                     
5
 The TEO, expressed in R$/MWh, is established by ANEEL and aims to financially compensate hydros that provide 
energy to the MRE. 
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5. A New Market Design 
Focusing on the enhancement of the flexibility for market participants to bear their contracts, while 
still ensuring the efficiently use of the energy resources and maintaining the current level of the 
security of supply, and bearing in mind some proposals of interventions in the Brazilian electricity 
market (Revitalization Committee of the Electricity Sector, 2002) (Simba, 2005), a new market design 
was developed to be applied to hydrothermal systems. This market design is supported by the 
following proposed virtual reservoir model: 
 
 Each cascade of hydro stations operates as an equivalent reservoir; 
 Each agent has a virtual account that represents how much energy is virtually stored in his hydropower 
plant; 
 For each accounting period, each account is fed by the fraction of the total affluent energy of the 
equivalent reservoir proportional to the hydro’s physical guarantee. 
Then, the ensuing sequence of events should be followed: 
 
1º The system operator does his work as it currently does (running NEWAVE, DECOMP as well as other 
software, procedures and schemes), and defines the amount of generation for each power plant. So, the 
efficiency of the use of the energy resources and the security of supply are maintained at the current 
levels; 
2º It is calculated the “remaining demand”, which is equal to the total demand minus the total dispatch of the 
thermal power plants; 
3º It is established a liberalized hydro short-term market for this remaining demand: 
a. Regarding the price bid: hydros can bid a price between zero and the cost of the cheaper 
thermal power plant dispatched in this period; 
b. Regarding the quantity bid: each agent can offer any value within the balance of his account; 
4º The final short-term market price is calculated as a weighted average considering the hydro short-term 
market price that comes from the hydro virtual short-term market and the variable cost of the dispatched 
thermal power plants and other energy sources. 
Thus, as can be observed in Figure 6, two worlds would coexist: the real one, associated with the 
power system considering physical effects; and the virtual one, related with the settlement system and 
with commercial effects. 
Figure 6 – Physical system (ISO operation) versus Commercial system (agents operation) 
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Through this market design, agents would be responsible for deciding, in commercial terms, how 
much they want to withdraw from their virtual reservoirs to meet their contracts. To do that, their bids 
have to be accepted in an auction that will be performed as a day-ahead market. In doing so, each 
generator has the opportunity to manage his contracts more efficiently, without affecting the real 
operation of the physical system. 
Furthermore, this model promotes a monitoring of the ISO performance based on comparisons 
between his decisions (the physical world) and the market participants decisions (virtual world). To 
address this issue, Figures 7 presents a scheme illustrating the decision making process in this new 
market design. 
Figure 7 – Decision making process: ISO decides to use water; agent decides to save water 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Figure 7 the ISO decided to use water, while the generation agent decided to save it. When these 
decisions are reversed (ISO decided to save and the agent to use), instead of having a virtual spillage, 
as shown in Figure 8, it can happen a physical spillage. 
 
  
Time t0:  Both systems (physical 
and commercial) start equal 
Time t1: ISO deposits a fraction of the total 
affluent natural energy in the virtual reservoir 
Decisions: 
 ISO decides to use (physical effect) 
 Agent decides to save (commercial effect) 
ISO Operation 
Real Reservoir 
Agent Operation 
Virtual Reservoir 
ISO Operation 
Real Reservoir 
Agent Operation 
Virtual Reservoir 
What did occur in the period?  
Answer: High water inflows! 
 So, ISO took the best decision 
What did occur in the period?  
Answer: Low water inflows! 
 So, Agent took the best decision 
Gain for the ISO: 
 Positive image. 
Loss for the Agent: 
 Agent lost the opportunity 
to sell this energy spillage. 
 
Loss for the ISO: 
 Negative image since 
the ISO performance 
lower than Agent. 
Gain for the Agent: 
 In scenario of water 
scarcity, energy is more 
expensive. And agent has 
large amount of energy to 
offer. 
Virtual spillage 
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Figure 8 – Decision making process: ISO decides to save water; agent decides to use water 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
At the end of this process, the prices no longer result primarily from a chain of computational models 
that may eventually present problems related with inconsistencies and transparency, but they can be 
obtained through the combination of thermal costs originated from the ISO dispatch and the short-term 
market price arising from the liberalized hydro short-term market.  
Thereby, this market design maintains the same levels of the previously mentioned efficiency and 
security, while increases the level of flexibility of the agents’ commercial aspects. This flexibility can 
be achieved by replacing the MRE and the seasonalization process by a virtual reservoir model. As a 
result, the management of (virtual) reservoirs is the responsibility of each hydro, which could save 
(virtual) water according to their own risk perceptions and in doing so the operation of the physical 
system is not affected at all. 
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